Think Change

After the elections: The EU in the new world order

June 25, 2024 ODI

The recent European elections came at a pivotal time for Europe and its relations with the rest of the world. In the continent, the economic squeeze, along with the public’s concern around security and migration, drove the outcome of the elections. 

Across the world, the rise in protectionist and nationalist ideology threatens the future of the multilateral system. At risk is the global commitment to the climate crisis and human rights. 

 The Brussels policy debate is highly Eurocentric, but has extraterritorial impact, often with unanticipated consequences, across the globe. There is an urgent need for European Institutions and Member States to navigate these challenges effectively, to shape a European response.

 In this episode of the Think Change podcast we discuss the outcome of the European elections and how this will influence the EU’s foreign policy; the future of the multilateral system; and how dialogue and more equal partnerships with the rest of the world is essential to maintain Europe’s standing in the world. 

Guests:

  • Sara Pantuliano, Chief Executive, ODI

  • Ambassador João Vale de Almeida, previously Ambassador of the European Union to the United Nations; Ambassador of the European Union to the United States; and following Brexit, the first head of the future EU delegation to the UK.

  • Professor Carlos Lopes, Honorary Professor at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance Faculty of Commerce at the University of Cape Town

  • Suzanne Lynch, journalist and author of POLITICO’s Global Playbook


Related resources: 

0:00:10 - Sara Pantuliano 

Welcome to the 50th episode of Think Change. I'm Sara Pantuliano. The results of the European elections will provide an important steer to the political direction of the European Union over the next five years. The vote has taken place at a pivotal time for Europe and the global relations it has around the world. In addition to shifting geopolitics, the enduring wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, economic and energy pressures continue and public concern around migration and security remains high. In the meantime, the climate emergency accelerates and risks from AI require urgent action. Meanwhile, we're seeing a rise in protectionist and nationalist ideology, which is coupled with an erosion of international rules, multilateralism and a commitment to human rights. Against this challenging global context, the policy debate in Brussels remains highly Eurocentric, but it has extraterritorial impacts. You know, it has often an unanticipated consequence across the globe. So today we want to explore how the outcome of the EU elections positions Europe globally. We want to discuss what the elections say about the sentiment of European citizens, their appetite to look at, work and consider the impact Europe has on the global stage.  

I have a fantastic group of colleagues joining me to explore these questions. I'm delighted to welcome Suzanne Lynch. Susan is the author of Politico's Global Playbook. Also joining us is Professor Carlos Lopes. Carlos is an honorary professor at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance at the University of Cape Town and a visiting senior fellow at ODI. And, last but not least, Ambassador João Vale de Almeida. João was previously the ambassador of the European Union to the United Nations, the United States and, following Brexit, the first head of the EU delegations to the UK, and he is the chair of the board of ODI Europe. Welcome to you all, Suzanne. Let me start with you. How do you think the European election results position the EU on the global stage and what impact do you think they will have on EU's foreign policy?  

0:02:22 - Suzanne Lynch 

Well, I think the results of the European election. Definitely we saw, as we expected, an increase in we call them far right, but that is itself a contested term but more right-wing parties, as expected of the parliament, and I call them actually more nationalist parties across Europe that did gain seats in the European parliament. Now, of course, we know that the centrist parties, the more traditional groups, did hold their own and the centre did hold there, but there is undoubtedly a rise in support for those more Eurosceptic parties. So I think that reflects, or that's sending a message to the EU and the EU leadership and the other parts of the EU about the voters' priorities. And, like many elections across the world, foreign policy was not top of the agenda for voters. That won't be a surprise to any listeners. It's the same in most countries and instead there were things like migration, economic situation, those kinds of things. So I think it's going to be an interesting next five years for the European Union.  

What we've seen over the last few years towards the end of the Von der Leyen commission, the first commission, has been, I think, two impulses. In one way, I think Europe and the EU is aware that it is maybe can't depend on the United States if there is a change in administration again after November's election, so that Europe needs to stand on its own and build alliances across the world elsewhere. But at the same time you have a- definitely a move inwards, more protectionist impulses. You're talking about strategic autonomy, that idea that Europe needs to do it alone, if you like, and they need to be more dependent on itself. So there's a kind of a paradox there and I think that has defined the last couple of years of the Von der Leyen Commission and I think will continue in the next five years.   

0:04:13 - Sara Pantuliano 

Thanks, Suzanne. Well, let's stay on the theme of the elections in the US as well. João, if Trump were to return to the White House, what would this mean for the EU, say, on security, on trade, on progress in addressing climate change? Do you feel the EU is preparing for a possible return of Trump in November?  

0:04:34 - João Vale de Almeida 

Thank you, Sara for this introduction. I largely agree with Suzanne, but let me make three points, if I may. The first one is to highlight the issue of transition. If you look at Europe, the EU. If you look at the UK, an important partner, and if you look at the US, these three entities are going through a political transition in 2024-25. So I think that's an important point to note. Europe will be, in the next couple of months, in full transition. You will only have the full institutions in place by the end of the year, which coincides with the American election. The British political scene has accelerated a little bit, with elections in July, but still the most likely there will be a new government, which implies a deal of transition. So I think we should bear that in mind.  

The second point, regarding the elections. I think the results of the European Parliament elections were more or less along the expected lines. There was less of a surge of the far right, as some expected, but still the trend is very much to the right. But I think my main concern will be the situation in some of the member states, because there you see, and if you take the case of France, which is the most emblematic one, but also the case of Germany, you will have weaker governments or weaker leaders as the result of the ongoing electoral processes, so this is something that we need to take stock of. Regarding the US, well, I think it's too soon to tell. I lived for almost nine years in the US with different presidents and I followed two presidential campaigns, and I think my starting point would be to say campaigns before August, the party conventions is too soon to tell where things are really going.  

The factors that will play in, in my view, will be, on one side, the economy. How much will Biden be able to capitalise on the good state of the economy? He has not been able to do so, so far. The second one is the impact of Trump's problems with justice. I don't expect them to be major, but you never know.  

The third point I will note is abortion and the impact this may have in a female vote, and particularly the suburban vote. This could cause some problems for Trump. The other factor is migration. Clearly the border, the handling of the border, where this can have impact in Biden's position. And, last but not least, I would follow attentively the Black and Hispanic vote, which is traditionally a Democratic base, but which is moving clearly to the right and to the Republican side. So I'll be watching these trends. Regarding our own preparation for Trump well, we know Trump, so we lived with Trump, We've worked with Trump. I'm afraid a second Trump will be more difficult than the first Trump. I'm afraid a second Trump will be more difficult than the first Trump. What I would advise you know our leaders, to do is to, you know, get our house in order as much as possible and be ready for a tough ride and, as much as possible, protect what we want to do together regarding Ukraine and Russia.  

0:08:02 - Sara Pantuliano 

Thanks, João. So I mean going back to the EU elections. I mean, despite the far right faring less well, we are undoubtedly seeing this global rise of nationalist ideology speak to a possible Trump second term as well, and that clearly poses an important threat to international cooperation. But, Carlos, I want to hear from you how and where you feel the existing multilateral system has fallen short, because I'm sure that the two are linked.  

0:08:32 - Carlos Lopes 

Well, first let's mention that these nationalist tendencies are also present in other parts of the world, including in my own continent, Africa. You see characteristics that are quite similar in terms of how you react to foreign interventions or foreign influence, and it's very important for us to note that this is part of a major trend that has something to do, or a lot to do, with developments, particularly in the demographic front, and I think we don't pay enough attention to the demographic shifts that are going to influence all the rest. If you have aging population in one part of the world, it's normal that the attitudes are going to be much more inward looking and more protective because of the older age of the population in general, but also because of the types of jobs that are going to be available in the future being more appealing to younger population. And all of this is going to become much more acute with the geopolitical tensions that arise as a result of these developments.  

And I think multilateral system is really a result of these developments, and I think the multilateral system is really not prepared for these changes. And one demonstration is what I call the battle of jurisdictions, where powerful countries or groups basically try to impose their own interpretation and their own views about different aspects that concern multilateral relations to others, and Africa is sort of at the receiving end. You know, you have a lot of measures that have been taken by the United States, by Europe, but also by China and others, that are going to affect the way Africa relates and trades, and this is not being done with consultations, not with a multilateral approach as we used to know it. So we have to get ready for a much more tense future where this battle of jurisdiction is just going to become much more exacerbated in terms of the way we interpret tax, the way we interpret trade.  

0:10:44 - Sara Pantuliano 

Thank you. João, you've represented the EU at the UN. Do you agree with Carlos?  

0:10:49 - João Vale de Almeida 

Well, first of all, I'm very glad to see Carlos again and it's great to have him in this meeting, and looking forward to meeting him again somewhere else in the world is always a very important contribution. Let me make my point on that. I would say that what we're living through is a clash of geopolitics and geoeconomics, boosted by a wave of domestic populism, and this, as Carlos says, is valid, certainly valid for Europe and the US, but it's also valid elsewhere. And the second point I will make, seen from a sort of Euro-Atlantic point of view, is that I see leaders in our part of the world, democratic leaders, being under enormous pressure in a very complex governance environment. You know, most governments are coalitions. They are weak by definition, and when they are not coalitions, the leaders are weakened by slim majorities in parliament and they are under pressure both from more radical forces on the right and more radical forces on the left. So the center is struggling in my part of the world, but they leave under a democratic rule. What I see on some other parts of the world are, you know, autocratic leaders, most of them strong men that play with others, and this of course creates a tension in the international scene which is very difficult to manage and within this, very often the victims are the countries that have built at the last part of the 20th century without providing any meaningful alternative.  

So again, I go back to my initial word, which is transition. We are transitioning from an order that we more or less knew how to manage to a certain degree, of disorder that we haven't yet found a way to manage. And this requires, in my view, from all responsible leaders, starting from my side with the European One, to have a great sense of responsibility, but also a great openness to dialogue with other parts of the world. And my last point is about demography. I couldn't agree more with `Suzanne. That explains the whole issue of the migration debate in Europe. Let's be frank, this is about us needing workers, but our public opinion certainly not being ready to accommodate as many workers as coming from many different countries as we are. Our economy is requesting. So the tension is there, the tension will remain there, and you know I have some scars from the migration discussions in the UN to know that it is extremely difficult to come to any sort of global understanding. But I think we should pursue that.  

0:14:15 – Sara Pantuliano 

Thanks, João. It sounds like a post-Gramscian analysis of the transition, almost. Suzanne, do you agree with Joao's assessment?  

Suzanne Lynche 

What's interesting and what I think one of the telling results of this European election has been that the EU is a member, it's a club of 27 countries, but I think the fact that in France and Germany, the two biggest countries, that the governing parties got such a drubbing in the European Parliament election and more right wing parties succeeded, I think that says something. I think that is significant and the EU is structured in such a way. It's not that France and Germany run everything there's qualified majority voting, but they do matter a lot.  

Whereas people talk about Viktor Orban in Hungary, he's a very significant figure. He has actively said he wants Donald Trump to win the election in November. His country, Hungary, happens to be the chair of the European Council for the next six months, so he will have a lot of power. But ultimately, you know, Hungary is a smaller country. It's a country of 8 million people. It's just one leader. But I do think when you're seeing these big founding members of the EU, this pushback or this messaging, I think that is very significant.  

In saying that, I think since Brexit, for example and Oyal was in London for many years. I think that Brexit and Britain's exit from the EU actually served to underscore a lot of people's support for the EU, because I think across Europe, people said, well, hang on, be careful what you wish for. We don't want to leave the EU. So you know people were shocked that Britain left. So, as a result, people like Marine Le Pen in France or even Victor Orban they're not advocating that they leave the European Union, they just want to change it and I think they will be able to change it subtly, but they will be able to shape policy both in terms of in the next few weeks, as the trading, the horse trading begins about top jobs.  

We've already seen the Italian leader, Giorgia Meloni, right-wing leader, saying hang on, we should be reflected in the makeup of the EU. You know she's an important figure. So I do think we're going to see more of a shift to the right in terms of EU policymaking, particularly on issues like migration and climate policy. I think they're the big ones and I think maybe less of an interest in foreign policy. I think they're the big ones and I think maybe less of an interest in foreign policy. Whoever gets the job as EU foreign policy chief, the position that's currently held by Josep Borrell, and the individual who may or may not be Kaja Kallis, the Estonian prime minister, that's going to influence how much the EAS, the EU's foreign policy wing, how that's going to engage with the rest of the world. So the individuals involved in European politics, I think, really do matter when it comes to policy.  

0:16:53 - Sara Pantuliano 

Yeah, I completely agree with you, and it's been interesting to see the shift of the rhetoric from coming out of the EU to well, let's reform the EU in the way we see it. You know, from many politicians on the right you talk about foreign policy. We see it from many politicians on the right you talk about foreign policy. Carlos, you were hinting very strongly to the imbalance of power and how this battle of jurisdiction in a way reflects a less than ideal approach to partnerships with Africa and the majority world from the EU. So what should the EU do to adapt its foreign policy to be a better partner, and what do you think are the obstacles in doing that?  

0:17:32 - Carlos Lopes 

Well, first let me disagree politely with Suzanne when she says that you know, climate and migration are going to be a center stage and there will be less interest in foreign policy. I think climate and migration are the center of foreign policy nowadays. Everything that is actually being discussed in the geopolitical front has something to do with the three mega trends, demographic, technological and climatic and the three mega trends are influencing the geopolitics. So this is really the center stage of foreign policy and I think, from an African perspective, that's the way we try to position the continent, through the African Union agency, in terms of how the power imbalances should be addressed. In terms of how the power imbalances should be addressed, for instance, on the climate front, if you look into the debates about foreign sovereign debt of African countries, it can be equated philosophically as Africa is the continent the closest to net zero. Therefore, it is not responsible for the problems that we have nowadays, but even less so historically, because there's not contributed to the problem. So it has a carbon credit and this carbon credit should be reflected in the way the international relations are established, in the financial architecture is constructed, and it is not. So it is the country, it is the region with the most difficult access to liquidity. It can't afford the stimulus packages that are influencing the way. You know, we are dealing with the climate transition and, as a result of that, Africa finds itself in dark straits, not being able to actually contribute positively to what could be the solution globally, because it has the largest possibilities for renewable energy, including green hydrogen, it has critical minerals and so on and so forth. So the power imbalance, Sara, reflects on this kind of tangible things.  

And then, at the other end of the spectrum, you will see that the EU has decided that countries that are exporting cocoa, just to give an example, should protect their forests and therefore they are going to be penalized if they don't protect their forests.  

Or it decides on introducing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, which is basically a carbon tax for countries that, in Africa, are going to export certain types of materials that are going to be quite devastating in terms of their GDP. So you see, you can't enter into these transitions without a proper dialogue, and there is no dialogue. The G7 has just approved this is not the EU, but the EU is well represented in the G7, has just approved to, you know, oblige all certification of diamonds to pass through Belgium. Of course, the three biggest exporters of diamonds, which are Botswana, Namibia and Angola, are claiming why is this measure that is supposed to curtail the possibility of usage by Russia of this possibility for financing is being decided without any consultation with the African producers, so you can see that the small ones keep paying the price of the developments that we are seeing in the international scene.  

0:21:19 - João Vale de Almeida 

Can I react to Carlos and Suzanne at the same time. I think they are not necessarily that distant, the two positions. The way I interpret what Suzanne said, at least the way I see it, is that there will be stability on foreign policy on the European Union side. If you take the major issues and the major issue for Al-Zawahir, of course, the situation in Ukraine and the relationship with Russia, even considering the arrival of more radical parties on the right, most of them, the most significant ones, are anti-Russian or anti-Putin and pro-Ukraine. And if you imagine that Von der Leyen would stay at the head of the commission and the names being put forward to the other positions, they all point towards stability. On that front I think there's a clear majority in favour of their enhanced defence investment from the European Union, as much as there is a very solid pro-US majority in parliament. But overall, I expect, on foreign policy pure, a certain degree of stability.  

But I also agree with Carlos that foreign policy in the 21st century is not 19th century foreign policy.  

It's more about the external dimension of internal policies and the dimension climate or demography or energy.  

So there I think the issues will be very difficult and my call on our African friends, particularly speaking to Carlos, is that they need to incorporate in their expectations the political reality in Europe these days or, for that matter, also in America.  

I mean, we cannot go on considering migration as being an issue that has no place in the debate and the dialogue between developing countries and the European Union and, for that matter, also the US. We cannot simply ignore and say we should not mix things. No, we'll have to find a new balance, a new paradigm in our relationship that incorporates the concerns of my leader, because, you know, these are democratic systems. Their purpose is to remain in power or to gain power and they have to respect the wishes of the citizens. And for demographic reasons and others, there is a shift towards a more sort of defensive approach, more protective approach, and my call and that again I agree with Carlos we need that. We need a different Carlos and if ever we want multilateralism to survive, all of us need to change the mindset and enter the room in a more open way.  

0:24:10 - Suzanne Lynch 

I mean just to come in on that as well. I mean, I agree on the relationship between Africa and Europe, and somebody who's very aware of that link between migration to this whole conversation is Giorgio Maloney, the Italian leader who invited a number of African countries to the G7 summit last week I was at in Italy. In terms of one of the biggest foreign policy issues for Europe, which is China, that's seen through the prism of trade. When we're talking about the EU's foreign policy, there's an interesting debate about how much of a foreign policy does the EU have really? How much of a player is it? Ultimately the EU? Or, as I see the EU, it was created as a trading single market entity and that is its success, and I think that trade is how it sees a lot of foreign policy.  

But that's particularly the case with China, which is one of the big geopolitical threats and Europe does not know where it stands on that. You've got very different views on that Picard and damaged their trade with China. At the same time, you're getting pressure from the US, from both sides of the house, really to be tougher on China. So, yes, the EU introduced tariffs last week, but they were much lower on China than the US. So that's another one to watch and the interest of business, I think, and certain countries in that debate is going to be crucial in the next few years.  

0:25:35 - Sara Pantuliano 

Yeah, but it's interesting, you know, what you're all saying is, on one hand, of course, the domestic pressure internally, as the polls have demonstrated, the big issues are around economy and migration and you know, on the other side is trying to continue to have global influence and you seem to be a better partner for so many countries. So how do you think they can better navigate this tension, because at one point it's going to break. 

0:26:01 - Suzanne Lynch 

On the ground, the EAS does foreign policy win. Having ambassadors in all these different countries, having more representation, that's a tangible way the EU is engaging where once it didn't so much, and particularly in Africa. And you've got countries around the EU table who are worried, at the moment of the conversation going on about whoever becomes the next EU high representative, that are they going to be solely interested in Russia and Ukraine and will neglect other parts of the world, like Africa, for example. Some countries are concerned about that. So that's kind of the beauty of the EU that you've got these 27 countries who have historically different interests in some parts of the world and want to make sure that, yes, Russia, Ukraine, is important. Obviously it's existential for Europe, but there are other parts of the world, like Africa, where we can't ignore.  

So it's very interesting that now, at the moment we're speaking, when they're deciding who gets what job, you're going to have some countries asking for commitments that their interests in terms of foreign policy are reflected and it's not just, you know, a tunnel vision when it comes to foreign policy. So I think that's a positive thing and that shows how sometimes having 27 countries which can always, of course, be a kind of a constraint on decision making because you have to get everyone on board, or sometimes a qualified majority most of them but that sometimes this can be a very positive thing because it holds all the other people to account and it allows smaller countries to say, well, hang on, what about this issue? Or hang on, what about that issue. So I think that's going to be interesting to see what kind of commitment we see in the next few weeks from people getting these top jobs about foreign policy and where they will put their interest.  

0:27:40 - Sara Pantuliano 

Thanks, Suzanne. Carlos, how do you see that? Can the EU navigate this tension?  

0:27:43 - Carlos Lopes 

Yes, it is not only possible but desirable, I think dialogue between Africa and Europe is. It is of course marked by a long history with ups and downs, but emotionally the Africans feel much more attracted and attached to their relations with Europe than any other part of the world. And even the relations that exist with the new actors in the African scene, such as China not as new anymore, but certainly the middle powers and I'm referring to the surge that we are seeing on trade with India, with the Gulf States, Turkey and other players are important, but the Africans continue to be somehow very much dependent emotionally on how they fix their relationship with Europe. It defines how they engage the world one way or another. And I think on climate, just to mention one specific area, there is unique possibilities for joint cooperation between Africa and Europe that will go and influence the rest of the world.  

But you know we need to get it right and some of the dialogue that we have been calling for. You know I have counted the number of initiatives that have been initiated in Europe for Africa. The count surpasses already 62 in the last 20 years, the last one being the Plan Mattei of Prime Minister Meloni is no longer credible. This is not the way it should be. It should be a different type of engagement, one that is based on tangible relations that are fundamentally addressing Africa's structural issues, and that has not been the case. Structural issues for Africa can be condensed in one specific objective. We have been, during the colonial times, a commodity exporter, and you know, in 2024, 80% of our exports are commodities. So we have to change that.  

0:29:58 - Sara Pantuliano 

Absolutely Well. We're almost at time. Let me just ask, João, one last question. Even the role you've played with the EU, what advice would you give to the next high representative, basically the foreign minister of the EU?  

0:30:13 - João Vale de Almeida 

Well, give me the afternoon and I'll do it. Listen, I would look at the big picture of the EU's external representation and God knows, we have had a few problems in recent times in organizing ourselves. I would look into that and think about the president of the Commission, the president of the European Council and the HRVP. I think that is a better way of balancing their acts. We should consider how much the president of the commission, with all its power and competencies and tools and budgets, can do, what the European Council president, who is supposed to be the one representing the EU on foreign policy at presidential level, and the HRVP at ministerial level, what they can do In a following one, what Suzanne was saying if ever we appoint an Estonian for HRVP, that is also a signal of priorities that would need to be somehow compensated by other signals or other priorities and that could involve an understanding of who does what.  

The same and, even more importantly, for the division of labor between the president of the commission and president of the European Council. I have experience in the past of other ways of managing this relationship and, because of my previous responsibility on priorities, I think there'll be no doubt the first top priority is Ukraine and Russia and security in Europe. That goes without saying.  

I think we should do a lot more I would say a lot better in terms of our relationship and dialogue with the developing countries, in particular Africa, and I welcome and I take good note of some of Carlos' comments on that. I think we need to pay particular attention to the US, particularly if former President Trump is reelected. And then China, because it's the elephant in the room, as we all say, and this is an area, for instance, where I think we should have a much better dialogue with Africa and the developing countries about the role of China, so much as well for the role of Russia. But, speaking about China, I think we'll have to have a discussion with our partners UK and the US as far as the Western approach to China, but I would like to do that dialogue with African countries, for instance. China is very much present there in ways that we could discuss, but certainly there's a way to organize a better dialogue regarding the big players.  

0:32:49 - Sara Pantuliano 

Thank you so much, João, Suzanne and Carlos. We're currently at a very important juncture in a geopolitical moment. The whole conversation I mentioned it before it really made me think of the Gramsci's analysis of the interregnum the old is dying and the new cannot be born or struggles to be born, and I think that's very much where we are at the moment. And, as you've all said, I think what is gonna be really critical is to make sure that there is a genuine dialogue that can help the EU find a more constructive role in the world, but one that is really based on a more genuine engagement with its sort of partners around the world, and particularly in Africa. If you've enjoyed the episode, please do like, subscribe and rate it, and we hope that you will join us again next time.  

 

 

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